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Avoiding dangerous climate: results from the AVOID2 programme 
 
J. A. Lowe, N. W. Arnell, R Warren, A. J. Gambhir, D. Bernie and E Thompson 
 
 
The AVOID2 programme provided evidence for UK Government on what might constitute 
dangerous climate change and the feasibility of avoiding it. The programme quantified some of 
the benefits of moving from a world that warms by around 4-5oC to one limiting global warming 
to below or well below 2oC. Whilst there is evidence that this transition is feasible it will require 
early action to reduce emissions and to develop the potential for large-scale deployment of a 
range of low carbon technologies.   
 
 
1. Introduction 
Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) requires 
governments to avoid dangerous climate change (UNFCCC, 1992). However, whilst this aim is 
supported by most of the world's nations its implementation in practice remains a major 
challenge. There is no single accepted definition of dangerous climate change and there are 
different views over how such a quantity should be expressed. For instance, should it be defined 
in terms of triggering some rapid or irreversible change in a large-scale aspect of the planetary 
system, such as the loss of the Greenland ice sheet or a major shift in the circulation of the 
Atlantic Ocean? Or should it be defined in terms of impacts on people affected by flooding, or 
lack of water or food availability?  
 
The climate policy community has taken a pragmatic approach to this uncertainty and lack of 
agreement over what is a dangerous future by focusing on a limit to increases in global average 
near-surface temperatures. After the Copenhagen UN conference in 2009 this target was set at 
2°C above pre-industrial levels. More recently the 2015 Paris Agreement defined a new and 
tighter long-term goal of limiting warming to well below 2°C, and set an additional aspirational 
target of aiming towards 1.5°C (UNFCCC, 2015a). The Paris Agreement also contains a 
requirement to achieve net zero emissions of greenhouse gases before the end of the 21st 
century. In the real world such targets are inevitably a compromise between current estimates of 
the damage caused by future climate change and the ability for society to make the greenhouse 
gas emissions reductions needed to limit global average warming (and damage from climate 
change) below a given level. 
 
In order to make informed decisions about targets and how to achieve them, climate 
policymakers need robust and reliable information. The reports of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) provide much information, but these reports are assessments of 
published studies which have been undertaken for a wide variety of reasons with many different 
objectives. Policymakers often have very specific questions which cannot be answered by 
looking into the published literature. In the United Kingdom, the Government commissioned two 
research programmes, known as AVOID1 (see Arnell et al. (2013) and Warren et al. (2013) for 
summaries) and AVOID2, to provide policy-relevant information in the run-up to the annual 
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conferences of the parties to the UNFCCC – culminating in the Paris conference in December 
2015. AVOID results also contributed to the UN’s structured expert dialogue in 2013-2015, 
which reviewed both scientific evidence and policy considerations of the long-term climate goal 
and contributed to the major revisions in climate targets agreed at the Paris climate conference 
(UNFCCC, 2015b).This paper provides a brief overview of the AVOID2 programme. 
 
2. The AVOID2 programme 
 
The AVOID2 programme (http://www.avoid.uk.net/) ran from 2013 to 2016, and addressed three 
broad questions posed by climate policymakers: What are the characteristics of ‘dangerous’ 
climate change? What greenhouse gas emissions pathways will avoid ‘dangerous’ climate 
change? What is the feasibility of such pathways? 
 
The questions addressed by the project evolved as the policy context changed. In particular, the 
2013 UNFCCC conference requested countries to make pledges outlining their proposed 
emissions of greenhouse gases by 2030, in preparation for a deal to be reached at the 2015 
Paris conference (UNFCCC, 2013). The AVOID2 programme therefore also investigated the 
effects of these pledges on the likelihood of meeting climate targets, under the broad framework 
of the second research question. 
 
The AVOID2 programme involved reviewing the existing literature that was most relevant to the 
policy questions, re-analysing data from other studies and projects, and undertaking new 
analyses using (mostly) existing models. Central to the programme was continued dialogue with 
climate policymakers within the UK government to ensure not only that the research was 
addressing the right policy questions but also that the results were presented appropriately. 
Policymakers need ‘headline’ results – because they are assimilating a great deal of information 
from multiple sources – but also need to be aware of the limitations and caveats to the research. 
The AVOID2 programme therefore produced not only research reports, but high-level two-page 
‘policy cards’ and one-page ‘infographics’. A number of scientific journal articles have been 
produced already based on the research and further are in preparation or in review.  
 
3. What are the characteristics of ‘dangerous’ climate change? 
 
The purpose of this question was to provide information to policymakers on the risks of potential 
major abrupt or irreversible changes in climate and what the impacts might be under 
unmitigated emissions. 
 
3.1 Large-scale climate system changes and “tipping points” 
 
Several earth system processes could amplify warming (Good et al., 2014; Good et al., 2017). 
As permafrost melts carbon could be released from soil adding to the amount of greenhouse 
gas in the atmosphere and causing further warming, and this process would be effectively 
irreversible over centuries or more. Recent findings continue to show that the amount and rate 
of release are both highly uncertain but one recent study suggested this could add up to around 
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10% to warming levels in a mitigation scenario (Burke et al., 2017). The additional warming will 
likely be greater in scenarios with greater emissions. Major changes to the carbon cycle in 
tropical regions which would release more carbon into the atmosphere are also possible. 
Evidence from observations has added confidence in our understanding of how tropical forests 
are adversely affected by drought. However, earlier projections that the Amazon rainforest 
would suffer major die-back as a result of climate change have been superseded by projections 
suggesting that loss of the Amazon rainforest is less likely to happen due to climate change 
alone during the 21st century. 
 
Several thresholds involving large-scale system change involve the cryosphere. Loss of ice from 
the ice sheets can raise sea levels and may impact on ocean circulation. Collapse and melting 
of the Antarctic West Sheet (WAIS) and Greenland Ice Sheet could result in eventual sea level 
rise contributions of up to around 10m or more, but this would take many centuries. For 
comparison, the IPCC range of sea level rise under high emissions by 2100 is 0.52-0.98m 
(IPCC, 2013). For Greenland, observations show that the proportion of loss from surface melt 
has increased, becoming more consistent with long term model projections. One recent 
estimate suggests a global-mean warming threshold for irreversible Greenland Ice Sheet loss of 
0.8-3.2 °C (best estimate 1.6 °C) above pre-industrial, but the warming would need to be 
sustained for a very long period (Robinson et al., 2012). Additionally, there may be more than 
one stable configuration from this ice sheet. The bedrock topography of the WAIS lends itself to 
an inherently unstable ice sheet. Some degree of irreversible loss may have begun, although 
the eventual magnitude and rate of this irreversible loss is uncertain (Feldmann and Levermann, 
2015). There are new indications that the East Antarctic Ice Sheet (EAIS) and the northeast 
Greenland ice stream may be more sensitive to climate change than previously expected (Good 
et al., 2017).  
 
Loss of sea ice does not have a major direct effect on sea level but is an icon of a changing 
climate and can have significant effects on biodiversity and atmospheric circulation over Europe. 
Current estimates suggest that Arctic summers that are nearly ice-free are possible by the 
middle of the 21st century under high emissions, although this may be delayed or even avoided 
with lower climate targets (IPCC, 2013).  
 
Concern also remains that a major shift in Atlantic Ocean currents could occur with a collapse of 
the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation, greatly reducing the northward heat transport in 
the ocean. If a collapse were to occur it would have impacts such as reducing temperature, 
changing the spatial distribution of rainfall, and reducing plant productivity over a large fraction 
of the northern hemisphere (e.g. Vellinga and Wood, 2002). There is now greater awareness of 
the large natural variations in this ocean current on time-scale of decades or several decades 
but the current view remains similar to that of the last IPCC assessment, that a collapse of the 
circulation is unlikely during the 21st century (IPCC, 2013; Good et al., 2017). 
 
Overall, although the potential impacts of these large-scale changes are large and there is 
strong evidence that the likelihood of triggering the worst changes is lower with lower levels of 
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warming, the science is not yet at a point where it can say with a high degree of confidence the 
temperatures at which large-scale system changes might be triggered.  
 
 
3.2 Socio-economic impacts 
 
Policymakers are interested not only in the risk of large-scale climate changes and physical 
impacts but also the socio-economic impacts of climate change. These depend not only on the 
amount of climate change, but also on future changes in socio-economic characteristics and 
future adaptations to changing climate risks. There are, of course, a great many potential socio-
economic impacts of climate change, and the AVOID2 programme focused on indicators in 
different sectors which could readily be quantified under climate and socio-economic scenarios; 
it also considered some impacts on biodiversity.  
 
Figure 1 shows the change through the 21st century in four indicators of socio-economic impact, 
under high and low emissions scenarios (Arnell et al., 2016a). In each case, the impacts are 
calculated by first estimating the change in global mean temperature under each scenario using 
the MAGICC simple climate model, and then combining these temperatures with damage 
functions (Arnell et al., 2016b), which relate impact to change in global mean temperature. 
These damage functions were constructed using global-scale impacts models estimating 
impacts at a fine spatial resolution, run with scenarios describing changes in precipitation, 
temperature and other relevant climate variables derived from climate models and 
corresponding to different amounts of global warming. 
 
The four indicators shown in Figure 1 represent increases in exposure to water resources 
stress, the numbers of people exposed to river flooding, the area of cropland with a decline in 
suitability for agriculture, and the numbers of people exposed to heatwaves. The impacts 
assume a ‘middle-of-the-road’ socio-economic scenario, and the range shown in Figure 1 for 
each indicator represents uncertainty in both the projected increase in temperature and the 
spatial pattern of change in rainfall and temperature. If the global average temperature 
increases by 5oC, in 2100 approximately 3 billion people would be at increased risk of water 
scarcity, 150 million people would be exposed to river flooding each year, 7.5 million km2 of 
cropland (just over 50%) would become less suitable for agriculture than it is at present, and 
more than 12 billion people would be exposed to heatwaves per year (meaning that many 
people would be exposed more than once). The figure also shows that impacts would be 
reduced substantially under a lower-emissions pathway that met a 2°C target, with different 
proportional effects for the different indicators. This is because the shape of the relationship 
between level of warming and impact varies between sectors. Future adaptations to climate 
change are not included, so the figure represents exposure to risk rather than predicted actual 
impact. 
 
For a given emissions scenario, there is clearly a wide range of uncertainty in the estimated 
impacts. This is due to uncertainty in the projected regional changes in climate, particularly 
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precipitation. The figure also hides considerable variability in impact between regions (Arnell et 
al., 2016a). 
 
4. What greenhouse gas emissions pathways will avoid ‘dangerous’ climate change? 
 
This part of the programme examined the emissions pathways that would achieve specific 
climate targets, and also at the effects of the pledges of emission reductions made by countries 
prior to the Paris Agreement. 
 
4.1 What pathways meet specific climate targets? 
 
The first AVOID approach to investigating the feasibility of limiting warming to below 2°C or 
even 1.5°C used the IPCC 5th assessment database of integrated assessment modelling 
scenarios (IPCC, 2014; Bernie & Lowe, 2014). This is a database of around 1000 different 
potential scenarios for future emissions and, when there is enough detail to simulate the 
climate, the future global temperature change, made using a wide variety of integrated 
assessment models and socio-economic assumptions. The scenarios were defined to answer 
particular questions, so do not necessarily span the full range of uncertainty, but nevertheless 
provide an indication of how different emissions pathways could translate into changes in 
temperature. 
 
Only around 80 scenarios in the database with emissions that peak at or after 2015 (the best 
that can be expected in reality) result in a warming of no more than 2oC. Half of these reach 
below 1.75oC by year 2100, but none fall below 1.5oC. Many of the scenarios that produce 
temperature increases below 2oC in 2100 actually include a temperature ‘overshoot’ with higher 
temperatures earlier in the century: this overshoot can be up to 60 years long, and most 
overshoots are less than 0.2oC. In most of the sub-2°C scenarios total primary energy use is 
higher in 2100 than at the present day, but in all there are major reductions in fossil fuel use, 
usually the rapid deployment of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies, and rapid 
deployment of renewable power generation. The split between different renewable sources 
varies between scenarios, and whilst some include nuclear power others can achieve the 2°C 
target without it.  
 
Almost all of the scenarios include technologies to artificially remove greenhouse gases 
(‘negative emission technologies’), of which the most widely used is BECCS (bioenergy with 
carbon capture and storage). Here biomass is used for power generation with the carbon that is 
emitted captured and put into long-term storage. However, there are biophysical constraints on 
the amount of BECCS that is feasible (Wiltshire & Davies-Barnard, 2015). For instance, 
converting forest land to annual bioenergy crops changes the albedo of the land surface and the 
transfer of both heat and moisture between land and the atmosphere. These effects combine to 
alter the effectiveness of biofuels in regulating warming and can lead to an increase or decrease 
in temperature, depending on location (Betts, 2000). For conversion from forest to biofuels our 
modelling suggested an additional net global cooling term may result, whereas conversion of 
abandoned land to biofuels has less potential to make a contribution. The conversion of forest 
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also releases extra carbon into the atmosphere: our results show that planting biomass crops 
for BECCS in the wrong place could therefore increase 21st century global temperatures. Taking 
these biophysical, earth system and feasibility effects together, the evidence suggests that the 
amount of BECCS that is biophysically-feasible may be less than the amount assumed in many 
of the published emissions scenarios which achieve low temperature targets. Further, the land 
which is biophysically-feasible for BECCS may be required for food production or have high 
conservation value.  
 
The scenarios that reach year 2100 with a global mean warming between 1.75 and 2°C typically 
peak emissions between 2020 and 2030, have net negative emissions from between 2060 and 
2080 and a mean 2030 to 2050 reduction in annual CO2 emissions of around ~25GtCO2 (Figure 
2). The scenarios that reach below 1.75C by 2100 typically have emissions peaks and a start of 
negative emissions weighted earlier than the 1.75 to 2C scenarios. This analysis is consistent 
with the recent review by van Vuuren et al. (2016). A new generation of scenarios is in 
production by the international community, which include investigating the emissions below the 
existing set and giving a higher chance of limiting warming to below 2°C (O’Neill et al., 2016). 
  
 
 
4.2 What are the effects of the emission reduction pledges made before the Paris 
Agreement on temperatures future warming levels? 
 
Before and following the Paris climate conference in 2015 many nations pledged emission 
reductions, typically out to 2030. These Nationally Declared Contributions (NDCs) are designed 
to encourage early action by countries towards achieving the long-term climate goal of limiting 
warming. A key question then becomes whether the INDCs are compatible with the long-term 
climate targets: are the pledges sufficient?  
 
Our estimates in early 2015 – when many, but not all, pledges were submitted and interpreted - 
found that if the pledges were added together they gave a central estimate of the emission level 
of around 54 GtCO2e1 in 2030, with an uncertainty range that depends on how the pledges are 
interpreted and the fact that some pledges are conditional on other conditions being met (the 
Paris Agreement subsequently puts the central estimate at 55 GtCO2e). The AVOID2 
programme first looked at the potential effects of these pledges using the scenarios in the IPCC 
data base, correlating emissions in 2030 with the warming by 2100 (Figure 3). There is a 
correlation between eventual warming and 2030 emissions level, but with emissions in 2030 up 
to around 55 GtCO2e the rise in temperature covers a wide range and can be between 1.5 and 
3.5oC. Additionally, there are emission pathways with levels above 55GtCO2e in 2030 that still 
limit warming to well below 2°C, and some pathways with emissions well below 55GtCO2e in 
2030 that eventually exceed 2°C. While the emission reductions to 2030 do encourage progress 
towards a low-carbon world, on their own they are not sufficient to limit warming to well below 
2°C. This is because the total carbon budget is approximately linearly proportional to warming 
                                                 
1 i.e. including not just carbon dioxide, but also the effects of other greenhouse gases as equivalent 
carbon emissions, estimated using global warming potentials. 
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level (Allen et al., 2009), and contributions to the remaining budget can occur after 2030. Other 
studies looking at the Paris pledges make similar conclusions (e.g 
http://climateactiontracker.org/global.html).  
 
A further strand of research in AVOID2 research provided a further way to look at pathways 
leading to particular levels of future warming. This approach produced new emission pathways 
using the TIAM-Grantham integrated assessment model (Gambhir et al., 2017a) to estimate 
future carbon emissions, given middle-of-the-road socio-economic assumptions. This is 
described in the next section.  
 
 
 
5. What is the feasibility of pathways which meet climate targets? 
 
There are several factors that determine whether a particular temperature target is feasible. One 
aspect relates to the characteristics of the physical climate system. For a given pathway of 
emissions of greenhouse gases the pathway of warming depends on metrics such as the 
transient climate response, equilibrium climate sensitivity and the climate-carbon cycle 
feedback, all of which are still highly uncertain. This means that for a given scenario of future 
emissions it is not possible to identify a unique warming level but rather a probability of limiting 
warming to below a particular value. Current conventions focus on the median warming level 
(giving at least 50% chance of limiting warming below a target), or the warming for which there 
is a likely (>66%) chance of remaining below a given level. The emissions pathways that 
achieve low temperature targets assume the implementation of substantial amounts of BECCS, 
taking CO2 from the atmosphere, which brings in another aspect of physical feasibility.  
 
A further aspect of the feasibility of limiting warming to temperature targets of below 2°C is 
whether society can devise technically and economically feasible means to satisfy the energy 
needs of a changing population whilst reducing emissions. For a warming level of less than 2°C, 
achieved with a 50% likelihood, the feasibility question typically means ‘will society be able to 
deploy low-carbon technologies fast enough and cheaply enough during the 21st century’? This 
aspect of feasibility can be examined with the TIAM-Grantham energy systems model, which 
simulates energy use and emissions by region and sector, and can be constrained by imposing 
limits on the total amount of carbon which can be emitted. Emissions of other greenhouse gases 
were produced using other linked energy models (Gambhir et al., 2017b). These emissions 
were then used as input to a version of the MAGICC simple upwelling diffusion energy balance 
climate model (e.g. Wigley and Raper, 2001) to estimate the global warming response and 
account for the physical climate system constraints on feasibility. 
 
Our analysis with TIAM-Grantham (Gambhir et al., 2017a; Napp et al., 2017) shows that the 2oC 
is technically feasible to achieve, but the later the reductions in emissions begin and the later 
key technologies are deployed, the greater the costs (Figure 4). Achieving a 2oC target implies 
much higher rates of decarbonisation than seen historically (Figure 5). Achieving the energy 
transitions that we simulated were necessary to meet the 2oC target requires the uptake of a 
8 
range of low-carbon technologies at rates of up to 20% per year. This is comparable to the 
fastest rates of sustained energy technology deployment seen in the past. For instance, France 
achieved a growth rate of around 19% per year for nuclear power between 1977 and 1997, 
Denmark achieved a 20% growth in wind power between 1997 and 2008, and global installed 
solar photovoltaic capacity grew from by 50% per year from 2009 to 2014 (Napp et al., 2017). 
However, deploying multiple technologies at very high growth rates over sustained periods is 
likely to require not only reductions in the cost of renewable energy, but also effective global 
governance to support innovation, supply chains, skills and finance.  
 
To examine the feasibility of the Paris pledges, we also ran the TIAM-Grantham system with the 
total emissions of greenhouse gases constrained to be 55 GtCO2e in 2030, and simulated how 
energy systems could plausibly change over the 21st century keeping within a total carbon 
budget that yielded a 50% chance of keeping temperatures below 2oC. A number of emission 
scenarios that were compatible with limiting warming to around 2°C above pre-industrial levels 
were produced. These new 2030 scenarios have very rapid emission reductions after 2030, with 
some technologies, such as use of coal, being phased out very rapidly, whilst renewable 
technologies and carbon capture and storage is deployed rapidly. This is consistent with our 
earlier assessment of existing scenarios from the IPCC assessment. However, with TIAM-
Grantham we were able to go further and test how limiting the deployment rates of some 
technologies, based on past deployment rates, could push a “well below 2°C” warming limit 
towards significantly higher costs or even out of reach. This implies the need to increase 
incentives and remove barriers to deployment of low-carbon technologies as soon as possible. 
 
 
6.  Discussion and Conclusions  
 
The AVOID2 programme was designed to provide policy-relevant advice on ‘dangerous’ climate 
change to government climate policy-makers. It combined literature reviews, analysis of existing 
results and new assessments, typically with existing models. The programme evolved as the 
policy questions evolved – particularly in the run-up to the 2015 Paris conference – and much 
effort was devoted to presenting results in a manner directly relevant to policy makers who have 
to assimilate information from many different sources. 
 
The research presented evidence to policy-makers on the characteristics of ‘dangerous’ climate 
change, identifying the major potential risks to the climate system as a whole, assessing the 
likelihood of passing key ‘tipping point’ thresholds, and describing socio-economic impacts that 
could be anticipated if emissions were not reduced. It was found that in order to achieve low 
temperature targets, such as limiting the increase in temperature to 2oC, global emissions would 
ideally peak at or before 2020 to 2030. It could be technically feasible to meet a 2oC target if 
countries met their pledges under the Paris Agreement, but this would require significant 
reductions in emissions in future years. However, there are biophysical, technical, economic 
and socio-political constraints on potential changes in future emissions – for example, for the 
implementation of BECCS. 
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The research also highlighted a key issue with many existing scenarios of the future from 
integrated assessment models, which is the need to challenge with more rigour the assumptions 
about future technology costs and deployment rates, as we did in AVOID2. This will involve 
testing the assumptions more in terms of past changes and questioning further the engineering 
aspects of the technologies that might be needed. Additionally, there is also a need to better 
account for political and behavioural aspects of feasibility. These provide limits on whether the 
model worlds described in scenarios from integrated assessment models become feasible in the 
real world. 
 
Whilst the AVOID2 programme provided many answers to policy-maker questions, it also 
identified major gaps in our understanding of how the climate system is likely to respond not 
only to future emissions but also to policy interventions to reduce those emissions. For example, 
important bio-physical processes and feedbacks – such as the thawing of permafrost – are 
currently not well-represented in models and can have a big effect on future changes in climate. 
The programme also challenged the project scientists to present complex information, 
characterised by high uncertainty, to policy audiences in ways that succinctly presented the 
headline messages whilst preserving the caveats.  
 
Finally, whilst our focus was on warming limits of below or well below 2C there is an increased 
focus on looking even lower at 1.5C. AVOID2 provides research approaches that can be 
deployed further for these lower warming limits. 
 
7. Acknowledgements 
This research uses results from the AVOID2 programme (DECC and Defra) under contract 
number 1104872 (www.avoid.uk.net). 
 
 
8. References 
 
 
Allen, M.R. et al. (2009) Warming caused by cumulative carbon emissions towards the trillionth 
tonne. Nature 458, 1163-1166 
Arnell, N.W., Lowe, J.A., Brown, S., Gosling, S.N., Gottschalk, P., Hinkel, J., Lloyd-Hughes, B., 
Nicholls, R.J., Osborn, T.J., Osborne, T.M., Rose, G.A., Smith, P. & Warren, R.F. (2013) 
A global assessment of the effects of climate policy on the impacts of climate change. 
Nature Climate Change 3, 512-519.  
Arnell, N.W. et al. (2016a) Global and regional impacts of climate change under Representative 
Concentration Pathways (RCPs). AVOID 2 WPB2b (http://www.avoid.uk.net/) 
Arnell, N.W. et al. (2016b) Global-scale climate impact functions: the relationship between 
climate forcing and impact. Climatic Change 134, 475-487 
Bernie, D. & Lowe, J.A. (2014) Future temperature responses based on IPCC and other existing 
emissions scenarios. AVOID 2 WPA.1 Report 1 (http://www.avoid.uk.net/) 
Betts, R. (2000) Offset of the potential carbon sink from boreal forestation by decreases in 
surface albedo. Nature 408, 187-190. 
10 
Burke EJ, Ekici A, Huang Y, Chadburn SE, Huntingford C, Ciais P, Friedlingstein P, Peng SS, 
Krinner G. Quantifying uncertainties of permafrost carbon-climate feedbacks. Biogeosci. 
14, 3051-3066. (doi:10.5194/bg-14-3051-2017) 
Feldmann, J. and A. Levermann (2015). Collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet after local 
destabilization of the Amundsen Basin. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America 112(46): 14191-14196. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.1512482112. 
Gambhir, A. et al. (2017a) Assessing the feasibility of global long-term mitigation scenarios. 
Energies 10, 89; doi:10.3390/en10010089 
Gambhir, A. et al. (2017b) The contribution of non-CO2 greenhouse gas mitigation to achieving 
long-term temperature goals. Energies 10, 602; doi:10.3390/en10050602 
Good, P. et al. (2014) An updated view of tipping points and the relevance for long-term climate 
goals. AVOID 2 WPA.5 Report 1 (http://www.avoid.uk.net/) 
Good P et al. (2017). Recent progress in understanding climate thresholds: ice sheets, the 
Atlantic meridional overturning circulation, tropical forests and responses to ocean 
acidification. Under review at Progress in Physical Geography. 
IIASA (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis) (2015) AR5 Scenario Database 
http://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/AR5DB (2015) 
IPCC (2013) Summary for Policymakers, in Climate Change 2013, The Physical Science Basis. 
Stocker, T. et al. (eds) (Cambridge Univ. Press). 
IPCC, 2013 Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group 
I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
[Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. 
Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United 
Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pp 
IPCC, 2014b Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working 
Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change  [Edenhofer, O., R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K. 
Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier, et al. (eds.)]. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. 
Napp, T. et al (2017) Exploring the feasibility of low-carbon scenarios using historical energy 
transitions analysis. Energies 10, 116; doi:10.3390/en10010116 
O'Neill, B. C., Tebaldi, C., van Vuuren, D. P., Eyring, V., Friedlingstein, P., Hurtt, G., Knutti, R., 
Kriegler, E., Lamarque, J.-F., Lowe, J., Meehl, G. A., Moss, R., Riahi, K., and 
Sanderson, B. M (2016). The Scenario Model Intercomparison Project (ScenarioMIP) for 
CMIP6, Geosci. Model Dev., 9, 3461-3482, doi:10.5194/gmd-9-3461-2016. 
Robinson A., Calov R. and Ganopolski A (2012). Multistability and critical thresholds of the 
Greenland ice sheet. Nature Climate Change. 2, doi:10.1038/nclimate1449 
UNFCCC (1992) United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change FCCC/Informal/84 
UNFCCC (2013) Further Advancing the Durban Platform.  FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1 
UNFCCC (2015a) Adoption of the Paris Agreement FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
11 
UNFCCC (2015b) Report on the structured expert dialogue on the 2013-2015 review. 
FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1 (http://unfccc.int/science/workstreams/the_2013-
2015_review/items/7521.php) 
van Vuuren DP et al. (2016). Carbon budgets and energy transition pathways. Environmental 
Research Letters, Volume 11, Number 7. 
Vellinga, M. & Wood, R.A. (2002) Global climatic impacts of a collapse of the Atlantic 
Thermohaline Circulation Climatic Change 54: 251-267 doi:10.1023/A:1016168827653. 
Warren, R., Lowe, J.A., Arnell, N.W., Hope, C., Berry, P., Brown, S., Gambhir, A., Gosling, S.N., 
Nicholls, R.J., O’Hanley, J., Osborn, T.J., Osborne, T., Price, J., Raper, S.C.B., Rose, G. & 
Vanderwal, J. (2013). The AVOID programme’s new simulations of the global benefits of 
stringent climate change mitigation. Climatic Change 120: 55-70.  
Wigley TM, Raper SCB. 2001 Interpretation of high projections for global-mean warming. 
Science 293, 451–4. (doi:10.1126/science.1061604) 
 
 
  
12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Global impacts for four indicators under two emissions pathways. The high emissions 
pathway is RCP8.5 and the lowest is RCP2.6. The solid line shows the median estimate of 
impact and the shaded area shows the 10th to 90th percentile range. The plots for the flooding 
and heatwave indicators also show the impacts that would arise if climate remained at the 1961-
1990 level. 
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Figure 2: Emissions of CO2 (GtCO2) for the subset of scenarios that reach 2100 with a warming 
in the range 1.75 to 2C (left) and 1.5 to 1.75C (right). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Median warming in 2100 plotted against 2030 emissions: scenarios from the IPCC 
WG3 data base. The vertical bars show the range of the NDC pledges.  
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Figure 4: Illustrative accumulated 2012-2100 costs of mitigation to achieve a 2oC target, as 
share of global GDP, with different assumptions about the rate of deployment of new 
technologies. The costs were estimated using the TIAM-Grantham model, assuming a 5% 
discount rate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Estimated average annual rate of change of global CO2 emissions in the first decade 
after the start of global coordinated mitigation action to remain below 2°C in 2100 begins; the 
range is across three estimates.  
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